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I
ndustrial loan companies, or ILCs, are a small, but rapidly growing
part of the financial industry. These state-chartered institutions
operate in seven states and have nearly all of the same powers as
commercial banks. However, ILCs differ greatly from banks in one char-
acteristic—the type of companies that may own them. ILCs meeting
certain conditions may be owned and operated by firms engaged in
commercial activities, thus skirting the prohibitions on mixing banking
and commerce that apply to virtually all other depository institutions.
Commercial ownership is now a prominent topic in banking with
Wal-Mart’s recent attempt to open an ILC and Home Depot’s efforts to
acquire an existing ILC. At the center of this controversy are such ques-
tions as whether commercial firms—retailers, manufacturers, and others
—should be allowed to use ILCs to get into banking and what would be
the public policy implications of such entry.
Those opposing the Wal-Mart and Home Depot proposals, for
instance, contend that ILCs owned by commercial entities would face
significant conflicts of interest. Such ILCs, it is argued, would have
strong incentives to lend to customers of the parent company on a
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favorable basis and without due regard for standards of creditworthiness.
These conflicts might thus be resolved to the detriment of the ILC, its
customers, or the deposit insurance system and other elements of the
federal safety net. Another common argument is that Wal-Mart and
others might be able to exploit their size and existing customer relation-
ships in a manner that would give them a dominant role in banking
markets, thereby reducing financial competition. To allow Congress to
consider such issues, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) placed a moratorium until January 2008 on commercial firms
opening or acquiring insured ILCs.
1
While the Wal-Mart and Home Depot proposals are behind much
of the ILC debate, the public policy issues are much broader than these
two proposals. Financial and commercial firms have made significant
inroads into the ILC industry, mostly within the last decade or so. In
fact, among the most recognizable owners of ILCs are Merrill Lynch,
Morgan Stanley, American Express, General Electric, General Motors,
Toyota, BMW, Volkswagen, Target, and Harley-Davidson. Conse-
quently, many of the issues surrounding broader ownership of ILCs are
far from hypothetical. Considerable information already exists on how
financial and commercial firms use ILCs and what are the associated
issues and benefits.
This article uses this broader ownership experience with ILCs as a
starting point to examine the public policy issues that arise from mixing
banking and commerce. The first section reviews the history of ILCs
and the basic legal and supervisory frameworks under which they
operate. The second section looks at the reemergence of ILCs under
their new forms of ownership. The third section focuses on the ILCs
owned by financial and commercial firms, taking a close look at individ-
ual ILCs and the types of business they conduct. The fourth section
explores the public policy issues.
I. HISTORY AND REGULATION OF ILCs
ILCs, also known as industrial banks, first emerged in the early
1900s to provide small loans to industrial workers. This market devel-
oped because commercial banks were generally unwilling to offer
uncollateralized loans to factory workers and other wage earners withECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2007 43
moderate incomes. Much of the early success of industrial banks can be
attributed to Arthur J. Morris, who chartered the first ILC in 1910 and
established the basic framework for Morris Plan banks.
2 Morris Plan
banks spread to over 140 cities by the early 1930s and became the
leading providers of consumer credit to lower-income workers.
Since then, commercial banks and other institutions have largely
taken over the role of providing small consumer loans, thus leaving tradi-
tional ILCs with only a small segment of the consumer lending business.
More recently, though, ILCs have reemerged as a way for commercial and
financial firms to offer banking services without being subject to the own-
ership restrictions and parent company supervision that typically apply to
other companies owning depository institutions. This new growth is
further driven by a number of business or financial factors. For instance,
ILCs enable commercial firms to offer financing to their customers,
clients, or dealers, thereby supporting a company’s operations. For
example, auto companies and manufacturers can use ILC lending to help
boost sales of cars and other products. Such firms can also use ILCs to
attract new customers and retain existing ones. Furthermore, technologi-
cal advances in data processing, communications, and payment systems
are making it more cost effective to offer multiple services to customers,
thus opening the door for commercial firms to offer financial products.
ILCs have traditionally operated under their own unique regulatory
and supervisory system, but over the past few decades, this public oversight
has become more like that of other depository institutions. ILCs still
operate under special state charters and continue to be examined by state
authorities. The handful of states that still charter ILCs, though, have grad-
ually increased ILC powers to the point where most now operate under a
legal framework similar to that of state-chartered banks.
3 ILCs, for instance,
can generally engage in a full range of consumer and commercial credit
operations and other standard banking activities. At the same time, some
states do not allow ILCs to offer demand deposit accounts, and not all of
the states chartering ILCs welcome commercial ownership. In particular,
California passed a law in 2002 prohibiting commercial firms from acquir-
ing or opening ILCs in the state. This law was adopted after Wal-Mart
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Federal policy with regard to ILCs primarily has been set through
two pieces of legislation: the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions
Act of 1982 and the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987. The
Garn-St. Germain legislation made all ILCs eligible for federal deposit
insurance, thus replacing the case-by-case approval process the FDIC
had been using. This expanded eligibility for federal deposit insurance is
also significant since it brings ILCs under the supervision of both a state
authority and the FDIC.
4
The Competitive Equality Banking Act allows a company to own
an ILC without being subject to the same regulatory framework as bank
holding companies. As a result, ILC owners can avoid the restrictions on
conducting commercial activities that apply to banking organizations.
At the same time, this legislation closed other avenues that a number of
commercial firms had previously used to get into banking, thus putting
ILCs in a unique position within the financial system.
Under the provisions of the Competitive Equality Banking Act, an
ILC owner is excluded from activity restrictions imposed on bank
holding companies as long as its ILC is located in a state that requires
the institution to have FDIC insurance. In addition, the ILC must meet
at least one of the following conditions: 1) The ILC does not accept
demand deposits. 2) The ILC’s total assets do not exceed $100 million.
3) The ILC was acquired before August 10, 1987.
5 For larger nonbank-
ing organizations seeking to establish ILCs of more than modest size,
these provisions mean that their ILCs must avoid offering demand
deposits, although NOW accounts are still an option.
6
By meeting at least one of these three conditions, an ILC and its
owner can further avoid the consolidated supervision that applies to bank
and thrift holding companies.
7This ability to avoid consolidated supervi-
sion, though, does not hold true for ILC owners that also own a bank or
a thrift, or are a securities firm subject to oversight by the Securities and
Exchange Commission as a “consolidated supervised entity.”  Under con-
solidated supervision, holding company supervisors typically analyze the
condition, risk management practices, and capital of the parent company
and any significant nonbanking subsidiaries, particularly if these sub-
sidiaries could pose a risk to the bank or thrift affiliates. By avoiding such
supervision, some ILC owners thus face one less layer of regulation com-
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With regard to federal regulation of individual ILCs, the extension
of FDIC insurance to ILCs requires that these institutions comply with
many of the same laws and examination procedures that apply to other
federally insured banks and thrifts. This ILC regulatory framework
includes minimum capital standards, other FDIC standards associated
with safe and sound operations, consumer protection laws, and the
Community Reinvestment Act.
One other set of laws—Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve
Act—is of particular interest, given the relationships that might exist or
develop among an ILC, its parent company, and other subsidiaries or
affiliated entities. To control conflicts of interest and prevent insider
abuses and misapplication of bank funds, Sections 23A and 23B limit the
amount of, and the terms on, transactions that take place between an
insured depository institution and any company under the same owner-
ship.
8 For example, Section 23A generally limits the total amount of an
insured bank’s loans, asset purchases, investments, and certain other
transactions with any one affiliate to 10 percent of the bank’s capital and
surplus and to 20 percent with all affiliates. These limits, though, do not
apply to transactions fully secured by U.S. government obligations or a
segregated, earmarked deposit account at the bank. Section 23B requires
transactions with affiliates to be on terms and conditions comparable to
those on transactions with unaffiliated parties. As a result of these provi-
sions, ILCs are restricted in how much business they can conduct directly
with their parent company and affiliates.   
II. REEMERGENCE OF ILCs UNDER NEW OWNERSHIP
This legal framework has left ILCs as about the only option for
commercial firms to enter into banking and has thus opened the door
for a variety of firms to acquire ILCs. The current population of ILCs
can largely be grouped into three general categories: 1) Traditional ILCs
operate under the ownership of individuals or bank or thrift organiza-
tions. These ILCs focus on providing credit to consumers and small
businesses and offer a range of deposit products. 2) ILCs owned by a
financial company, such as a securities firm or insurance company, typi-
cally offer deposit or credit products to the parent company’s clients and
employees. They may also engage in specialty lending programs for46 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
institutional clients and businesses. 3) ILCs owned by a commercial firm
generally offer a range of financial services that support the commercial
operations of their parent, including credit card lending, loans to
support the sale of automobiles or other parent company products, and
home equity loans.
These expanded ownership opportunities have recently led to a
rapid growth in ILC operations, although the industry still remains a
fairly small part of the overall financial industry.
9 In January 2007, 58
insured ILCs were in operation, and 45 of these held Utah or Califor-
nia charters. The remaining 13 ILCs are located in either Colorado,
Hawaii, Indiana, Minnesota, or Nevada. Among the 58 ILCs, 37
could be characterized as traditional, 15 are owned by commercial
firms, and the remaining six are controlled by a parent already engaged
in financial services.
10
Total ILC assets have grown from about $12 billion at yearend
1995 to $213 billion at the end of 2006. Despite this rapid growth,
ILCs still hold only about 1.8 percent of the assets of all insured depos-
itory institutions. Much of the growth can be attributed to the ILC
activities of a handful of financial companies, which held over 69
percent of all ILC assets at yearend 2006 (Chart 1).
11 This growth has
largely come from securities firms converting the cash management
accounts held by their clients into insured ILC deposits, thus allowing
these firms and their ILCs to take advantage of existing business rela-
tionships rather than attracting a new customer base. Commercial
ownership of ILCs has also increased rapidly in recent years. But these
ILCs hold just over 14 percent of all ILC assets, far less than ILCs
owned by securities firms. 
The five largest ILCs each hold nearly $20 billion or more in total
assets. Combined, they account for 71 percent of all ILC assets (Table
1). Four are affiliated with financial services companies and the other
with a commercial firm. The largest traditional ILC with independent
ownership is Fremont Investment and Loan, Anaheim, California,
which has nearly $13 billion in assets and engages in brokered subprime
mortgage lending and commercial real estate and construction lending.
At the other end of the industry, over three-fifths (35) of all ILCs
operate with less than $500 million in total assets, accounting for about
3.5 percent of all ILC assets.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2007 47
Chart 1
ASSETS OF 58 CURRENT FDIC-INSURED ILCs, 1986-2006
Table 1















1990 1995 2000 2005
All other (37 charters)
Commercial (15 charters)
Financial (6 charters)
Institution Total assets  Total deposits
(in millions) (in millions)
Merrill Lynch Bank USA 67,235 54,805
UBS Bank USA 22,009 19,270
American Express Centurion Bank 21,097 4,446
Morgan Stanley Bank 21,020 16,555
GMAC Bank 19,937 9,910
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III. OVERVIEW OF INDIVIDUAL ILCs
ILCs operate under a wide range of ownership structures and busi-
ness strategies, particularly with the recent entry into the industry by
financial and commercial firms. To provide a perspective on these oper-
ations, this section looks at the characteristics of individual ILCs,
including their ownership, size, office structure, lending mix, sources of
funding, and business relationships with the parent company (see
appendix for a list of the ILCs discussed in this section).
12 In keeping
with the current public policy debate over ILC ownership, this overview
of individual ILCs focuses on those owned by large financial firms and
commercial companies. While ILC ownership experience by commer-
cial firms is the most relevant for the Wal-Mart/Home Depot debate,
the ILCs owned by financial firms are also important because they now
make up the vast majority of ILC assets and raise a number of public
policy questions as well.
13
ILCs owned by financial companies
Several different types of financial firms own ILCs, including securi-
ties firms, companies providing credit card services, and insurance
companies. The following discussion concentrates on the largest of
these, noting their similarities and differences.    
Merrill Lynch Bank (MLB)—Merrill Lynch and Co., Inc., owns the
largest ILC, Merrill Lynch Bank. Headquartered in Salt Lake City,
Utah, MLB has more than $67 billion in total assets. It has two
branches at Merrill Lynch offices—one in New Jersey and the other in
New York—and a variety of investment and lending subsidiaries.
MLB offers a number of different deposit accounts, with almost all
of this business generated through Merrill Lynch’s securities brokerage
subsidiary. Much of MLB’s rapid growth, in fact, has come from sweep-
ing balances out of cash management accounts at the brokerage
subsidiary and into MLB, thereby providing brokerage customers with
deposits insured up to $100,000 at rates competitive with, or even
exceeding, money market mutual funds. This practice is typical of ILCs
owned by securities firms. MLB offers money market deposit accounts,
certificates of deposit (CDs), individual retirement accounts (IRAs), andECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2007 49
also market participation certificates. The market participation certifi-
cates have returns that fluctuate with the stock market’s performance,
but the principal amount is protected. In addition, MLB has a small
amount of transaction accounts. More than 96 percent of the deposits at
MLB are placed in money market deposit accounts and, according to
recent FDIC estimates, about 80 percent of MLB’s deposits are insured.
In terms of its asset structure, MLB is similar to most large commer-
cial banks in the portion of its assets devoted to loans, but it has less need
to hold cash and maintains a larger securities portfolio. MLB holds a
variety of commercial, real estate, and consumer loans, with much of this
business generated through its lending subsidiaries. Commercial loans
make up nearly 47 percent of the loan portfolio, and many of these loans
were generated by a subsidiary which lends to midsize companies in 16
states. Real estate lending constitutes another 28 percent of MLB’s loans,
with some of this coming from a real estate subsidiary that does residen-
tial real estate lending throughout the nation. Another 16 percent of
MLB’s lending is through consumer loans. Much of MLB’s remaining
assets are in mortgage-backed and other asset-backed securities. 
Unlike typical depository institutions that might maintain a large
office network to offer retail banking services, MLB operates with
extremely low salary and premises costs. As a result, the ratio of its earn-
ings to average assets in 2006 was roughly twice the average earnings
rate of commercial banks. 
Other ILCs owned by securities firms—Several other ILCs are owned
by large internationally active securities and investment firms. These
include UBS Bank USA, Morgan Stanley Bank, Goldman Sachs Bank
USA, and Lehman Brothers Commercial Bank. For the most part, they
operate using a business model similar to that of Merrill Lynch Bank—
sweeping funds into insured interest-bearing accounts from the cash bal-
ances their customers maintain with securities affiliates. 
Another common characteristic among these ILCs is their lower
operating cost relative to commercial banks. Unlike large commercial
banks with their extensive retail banking networks, these ILCs each
operate with just a single office in Utah. Also, they typically have a very
small number of employees, instead relying on their parent company to50 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
generate and book much of the business they do. This operational struc-
ture results in high income levels for most of these ILCs, while allowing
them to offer competitive rates to their customers. 
Also, the ILCs owned by securities firms generally operate with a
higher level of capital than do commercial banks of similar size. For
example, the average equity capital ratio for commercial banks over $10
billion in assets is about 10 percent, compared with 13.4 percent for
Morgan Stanley Bank, 10.6 percent for UBS Bank, 12.3 percent for
Goldman Sachs Bank, 8.2 percent for Merrill Lynch Bank, and 13.8
percent for Lehman Brothers.  
ILCs owned by credit card companies—Several ILCs are owned by
companies that issue credit cards or provide a variety of services within
the credit card industry. One of these ILCs, American Express Centu-
rion Bank (AECB), is owned by American Express Company and
operates out of its credit card processing center in Utah and an offshore
funding facility in Grand Cayman. AECB has $21.1 billion in assets,
most of which consist of credit card loans to individuals. Funding for
these loans largely comes from other borrowed funds, brokered deposits,
and foreign deposits. As a result, AECB mostly operates as a credit card
bank for American Express. Its earnings are well above that of the typical
bank or ILC due to high interest income from credit cards, moderate
funding costs, very low salary and premises expenses, and other operat-
ing benefits provided by its parent.
Several other ILCs focus on credit card lending. Advanta Corp.,
which has a background in consumer credit and subprime lending, owns
an ILC in Utah that provides small business credit cards on a nationwide
basis. Another ILC, Merrick Bank, markets secured and unsecured credit
cards on a nationwide basis and is owned by a company that offers a
variety of services for issuers of credit and debit cards.
ILCs owned by insurance companies—Another group of ILCs are
owned by firms conducting insurance activities and other related busi-
ness.
14 USAA Savings Bank, an ILC in Nevada, has $5.8 billion in assets
and provides banking services and credit cards to military personnel and
their families. USAA Savings Bank is owned by United States Automobile
Association—an insurance and diversified financial services organization.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2007 51
Exante Bank is an ILC owned by UnitedHealth Group and is located in
Utah. It offers healthcare savings accounts, healthcare account and flexible
spending cards, and other healthcare payments services.
Another ILC, Fireside Bank, is owned by a broad-based insurance
company and finances automobiles through the purchase of retail
installment contracts from automobile dealers. 5 Star Bank has its main
office at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and is
owned by the Armed Forces Benefit Association, which provides low-
cost life insurance to military personnel. 5 Star Bank primarily serves
members of the armed forces and offers a full range of deposit products,
a nationwide credit card operation, and a limited amount of real estate
lending. Most recently, Well Point, Inc., one of the country’s largest
health insurance companies, received FDIC approval on its application
for an ILC charter in Utah.
15 The majority of these ILCs thus were
formed to provide banking services to the parent company’s insurance
customers, although several serve other market niches.    
ILCs owned by commercial companies
While the majority of the industry’s assets are controlled by ILCs
owned by financial companies, ILCs owned by commercial companies
also play an important role in this industry. As noted earlier, most com-
mercially owned ILCs focus on activities that support the commercial
activities of their parent, while a few engage in broader banking services.
Commercially owned ILCs fall into two categories, those owned by
automotive companies and those owned by other commercial parents. 
ILCs owned by automotive companies—Automotive companies have
shown particular interest in ILC ownership. GMAC, Volkswagen,
Toyota, BMW, and Harley-Davidson have ownership interests in ILCs,
and Daimler-Chrysler has an ILC application pending with the FDIC.
16
Some of these companies use their ILC to finance automotive sales,
while others offer financial products, such as credit cards and home
equity loans, to owners of their automobiles or to auto dealers.
GMAC Automotive Bank (GMACB) has become the largest com-
mercial ILC with total assets of $19.9 billion.
17 GMACB began
operations in 2004 from a single office in Utah for the purpose of under-
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network of independent GM dealers. Although the bank continues with
this business, $13.4 billion of its $16.4 billion in total loans now consist
of 1-4 family residential mortgages. Much of this real estate lending
appears to have come to GMACB in late 2006 after GMAC began
winding down the operations of a federal savings bank it owned. Most of
the other loans at GMACB are consumer-related auto paper.   
GMACB’s funding is from a mixture of deposits and Federal Home
Loan Bank advances. GMACB had $9.9 billion in deposits at yearend,
virtually all in nontransaction accounts and more than half in brokered
deposits issued in denominations of less than $100,000. To help support
its new mortgage lending operations, GMACB has nearly $7.3 billion
in Federal Home Loan Bank advances.
GMAC also operated a commercial mortgage business through
another ILC in Utah, GMAC Commercial Mortgage Bank. In 2006,
GMAC sold majority interest in this ILC to an investor group led by
affiliates of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., Five Mile Capital Partners,
and Goldman Sachs, while retaining a 21 percent interest for itself.
18
The ILC now operates under the name of Capmark Bank. 
Other automotive companies—BMW, Volkswagen, Toyota, and
Harley-Davidson—that own ILCs generally operate these institutions in
a similar fashion to GMACB—underwriting loans or lease contracts for
automobile purchases. BMW Bank, with assets of $2.2 billion, and
Volkswagen Bank USA (VWB), with assets of $665 million, both
operate out of single offices in Utah and focus primarily on financing
automobile purchases for BMW and Volkswagen dealers. Each of these
ILCs offers credit card loans to car owners, and VWB also does 1-4
family residential real estate lending. On the funding side, both ILCs
rely on brokered deposits. As is typical for most commercially owned
ILCs, VWB does not offer transaction accounts or solicit retail deposits
from walk-in customers but uses brokered deposits under $100,000,
large CDs, some borrowings from the parent, and substantial equity
capital to fund its lending activities.
Eaglemark Savings Bank, chartered in Nevada and owned by
Harley-Davidson, underwrites both motorcycle and aircraft loans to
individuals and corporations. Compared with other ILCs, Eaglemark is
very small, with only $25 million in assets.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2007 53
Toyota Financial Savings Bank (TFSB) differs from the other ILCs
owned by automobile companies in that much of its current efforts focus
on providing banking products to Toyota, Lexus, and Hino (Toyota’s
commercial truck division) dealers. Initially, this strategy was targeted
toward dealers in Nevada and California, but eventually TFSB hopes to
expand nationwide. TFSB also plans to provide financial services to
owners of Toyota and Lexus automobiles across the United States.
TFSB has $176 million in total assets and operates from one office in
Henderson, Nevada. It now offers residential real estate loans and per-
sonal lines of credit for the parent company’s dealers and, under the trade
name of Lexus Financial Savings Bank, credit cards to Lexus owners.
Nearly three-fourths of TFSB’s loan portfolio is in real estate loans, and
the remainder is in credit card and other consumer lending, thus leaving
this ILC with very little auto financing business. TFSB also does not offer
transactional deposit accounts, with most of its funding coming instead
from other borrowings and a very high level of equity capital.
ILCs owned by other commercial companies
Most of the largest ILCs owned by commercial companies are asso-
ciated with automobile manufacturers. However, several other ILCs are
owned by other types of manufacturers and retail businesses. Their oper-
ations may provide a clue to what might be expected if Wal-Mart,
Home Depot, or other retailers were allowed to set up their own ILCs.
GE Capital Financial (GECF) has been part of GE Capital Corpo-
ration since 1990 and operates from a single office in Utah. This ILC
has total loans of $1.9 billion and only $218 million in deposits, con-
sisting largely of brokered accounts greater than $100,000. GECF’s
lending portfolio is primarily commercial and industrial loans—mostly
business credit cards. GECF once was active in consumer lending, but
this business was transferred in 2005 to GE Money Bank, a federal
savings bank now headquartered in Utah. Much of the support for
GECF’s operations comes from its equity capital base of nearly $1.3
billion. This reliance on capital rather than deposit funding helped
GECF achieve far higher returns on assets than the typical bank. 54 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Target Bank was chartered in September 2004 and is relatively
small compared to other commercial ILCs, with just $14.2 million in
total assets. Target Bank operates from a single office in Utah that is not
generally accessible to the public. It primarily issues private label credit
cards to businesses for use in Target stores. Since this credit card lending
could be viewed as benefiting the parent company (Target Corpora-
tion), Target Bank, like some of the other ILCs, must structure these
transactions in a manner that complies with the restrictions of Sections
23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act.
19 Target Bank does not accept
retail deposits but funds its lending activities through a line of credit and
from deposits from its parent company, thus helping ensure compliance
with Section 23A. 
This lending by Target Bank and by similar ILCs offers an insight
into one of the key arguments in the debate over commercial ownership
of ILCs: Are there conflicts of interest that might be detrimental to the
ILC, its customers, or the federal safety net?  The Utah Association of
Financial Services and the California Association of Industrial Banks
issued the following public comment in support of ILCs on this issue: 
Banks of this type, which originate loans to finance transactions with
affiliates, secure their loans dollar for dollar by a cash deposit in the bank
or U.S. government securities, or the loans are sold without recourse.
These banks provide advantages mostly for retailers in terms of conven-
ience, standardized nationwide programs, and exemption from licensing
in multiple states. For reasons described above, compliance with Section
23A effectively means the banks cannot utilize deposits to fund transac-
tions with any affiliate. Because they have no risk of loan loss, these are
perhaps the safest banks that currently exist. Banks in this group include
Target Bank and First Electronic Bank.
20
There are several other ILCs under commercial ownership: Pitney
Bowes Bank offers lines of credit and special-purpose credit cards to
buyers of the parent company’s products. EnerBank (a proposed acqui-
sition by Home Depot) is currently owned by a utility company serving
most of Michigan and offers a broad range of home improvement loans
to consumers who have been directed to the ILC by their contractors.
And First Electronic Bank, mentioned in the quote above, offers private
label credit cards to customers of its parent, Fry’s Electronics.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2007 55
One other commercial ILC, Transportation Alliance Bank (TAB), is
of special interest because it demonstrates the very unique role that this
type of ILC can play. TAB operates out of three offices in Utah and has
grown quickly to $483 million in total assets. It is owned by Flying J
Inc., the largest operator of diesel-fuel truck plazas in the United States.
To conveniently serve truckers and RV travelers on the road, TAB offers
a range of deposit and online banking services. For instance, with the
help of Wi-Fi zones and computers maintained at Flying J truck stops,
travelers can pay bills, transfer funds, and take advantage of other
banking services while away from home. TAB customers can also bank
through telephone service centers, ATMs, and the mail. Much of TAB’s
lending business is through accounts receivable financing and commer-
cial credit cards for truckers. TAB, moreover, makes its accounts
receivable financing available to truckers on the road, since they can use
the scanning and fax equipment at Flying J truck stops to send in copies
of bills of lading. With multiple truck stops in virtually every state,
Flying J and TAB are able to offer banking services on a nationwide
basis, thus saving truckers and RV owners the inconvenience of looking
for banks in unfamiliar cities and driving and parking their vehicles in
congested areas.
21
What does this ILC experience show us?
As can be seen from the descriptions above, ILCs owned by finan-
cial firms and commercial companies are pursuing a range of business
strategies, and most have relied on the parent company and its clients
and customers for much of their business. ILCs owned by financial
firms have grown rapidly and now make up the vast majority of ILC
business. These ILCs have benefited most directly from parent company
brokerage customers converting their cash management accounts into
money market deposit accounts (MMDAs) and other ILC deposit
accounts. For securities brokerage customers, such deposits offer the
advantage of deposit insurance and competitive returns. In fact, with the
wider range of ILC lending and investment options, securities firms are
likely to find it easier to offer competitive returns through an ILC rather
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mutual funds. Most of these ILCs are also using parent company con-
nections to generate their business, thereby reducing their need to have
an extensive office network or a large staff of employees.
The securities firms and insurance companies that own ILCs could
have chosen instead to acquire an insured bank or thrift institution and
be regulated as either financial or thrift holding companies. Their choice
of ILC ownership thus would appear to indicate a preference for being
regulated as an ILC and for avoiding the type of consolidated supervi-
sory framework applied to financial or thrift holding companies. In
some cases, these financial owners of ILCs may have also had some
broader activities that would not have conformed to the financial or
thrift holding company framework. 
Much like the ILCs owned by financial firms, most commercially
owned ILCs also benefit from the parent company and its customer base.
In fact, parent company customers, dealers, and distributors often make
up much of each commercial ILC’s lending business. Because these ILCs
have a ready base of credit customers and must search for ways to fund
this lending, they operate in a somewhat different fashion than the ILCs
owned by securities firms, which typically have a large base of deposits
from customer cash management accounts and must look for places to
invest these funds. Few of the ILCs owned by commercial companies
have attempted to start up a traditional retail banking business, which
would entail offering a broad range of lending and deposit products and
establishing a network of offices to attract customers.
In terms of overall performance, the ILCs owned by financial firms
and by commercial companies generally have been successful in finding
a unique and specialized base of customers to serve and in developing
innovative products for this targeted audience. These ILCs typically
operate with capital levels at or above banking industry averages. While
many of the ILCs have experienced rapid rates of growth, their parent
companies and their own internal resources have continued to supply
the funds necessary to keep capital in line with asset growth. Several
ILCs have changed their business strategies as they found better oppor-
tunities, and in a few cases organizational or ownership changes have
taken place. Most of the ILCs discussed in this section, though, have
achieved fairly high earnings levels, part of which can be attributed to
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company to generate business. Consequently, whether these earnings
rates and performance records will continue is likely to depend, in large
part, on the success in the main business lines of the parent companies. 
IV. PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH ILCs
Many of the public policy concerns now at the heart of the ILC
debate have been part of a long-standing discussion in the United States
over whether banking and commerce should be mixed and what role
commercial firms should have in the financial sector.
22 The ILC propos-
als by Wal-Mart and Home Depot help provide a new focal point in this
debate, although the same issues would also appear to apply to many of
the ILCs already being operated by commercial and financial firms.
While Wal-Mart’s withdrawal of its application for deposit insurance in
March 2007 may shift the policy debate somewhat, the basic issues will
still be around when the FDIC moratorium on new commercial ILCs
expires in January 2008.
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On the surface, the Wal-Mart and Home Depot proposals do not
raise any new issues in the ILC debate. Wal-Mart’s plan was to create an
ILC to process electronic payments—debit, credit, and check images—
made by Wal-Mart customers, thus allowing the ILC to capture the pro-
cessing fees that had been going to other banks. Home Depot’s proposal
was to acquire EnerBank and continue its policy of making home
improvement loans to customers who had been referred to the ILC by
their contractors. Many of those opposing these two proposals argued
that other steps would follow, such as Wal-Mart using an ILC charter
and the company’s extensive network of stores to establish a formidable
retail banking operation in all its markets, or Home Depot using Ener-
Bank’s charter to directly lend to its large base of consumers and
contractors. Whether any of this might occur is a matter for speculation.
However, it seems likely that if no changes are made to the legal frame-
work surrounding ILCs, other large firms may be interested in using this
avenue to get into banking, and some may eventually try to pursue
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From a public policy standpoint, continued entry and growth in the
ILC industry by commercial firms, and in some cases, financial firms,
could raise a number of issues. These policy concerns include the effects
on the safety and soundness of ILCs, conflict of interest issues, compet-
itive consequences, and implications for the federal safety net.
Safety and soundness of ILCs
The safety and soundness of ILCs could be influenced by a variety
of factors, ranging from their own regulatory structure and the manner
in which they are operated to the strength and condition of the parent
company. Since ILCs, by themselves, are subject to much the same set of
regulations, activity restrictions, and supervisory processes as other
insured depository institutions, they would appear to pose no unique
regulatory concerns on their own. One operational concern, though,
might be that a number of ILCs are largely reliant on the parent
company for generating business, while also receiving much help in
terms of office space, staff, and equipment. As a result, these ILCs and
their performance are closely tied to that of their parents, thus leading to
little diversification between the operations of an ILC and its parent and
to potential difficulties if an ILC’s operations had to be unwound from
that of a parent. Since many of the current commercial parents of ILCs
have a diverse range of activities and stable business operations, this
dependency on the parent organization has not proven to be a problem
so far.   
At the parent company level, commercial organizations owning
ILCs can escape the consolidated supervision placed on bank and thrift
organizations and a number of securities firms. Some of those opposed
to broader ownership authority for ILCs contend that this lack of con-
solidated oversight could create two problems. The owners might fail to
maintain the resources necessary to support their ILC, and ILCs might
be vulnerable to risks that develop in other parts of the organization.
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Consequently, a number of Federal Reserve officials and legislators have
suggested that ILCs and their parents are now operating with a “supervi-
sory blind spot” and should be subject to the same type of consolidated
supervision and enforcement actions that are imposed on bank and
thrift holding companies.
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This lack of consolidated supervision has yet to lead to any notable
problems. Although many of the ILCs owned by commercial and finan-
cial firms have grown rapidly, the previous section of this article showed
that these ILCs have benefited from having large parent companies with
the resources and market access to fund their expanding operations and
to provide capital at levels often well above industry standards. However,
consolidated supervision might prove to be helpful in a more stressful
economic environment or if continued expansion in the ILC industry
were to bring in parent companies less capable of supporting their ILCs.
One potential problem in extending consolidated supervision to
large commercial ILC owners is that it might be difficult and costly to
implement and, at best, might do little more than duplicate the disci-
pline already exerted by the marketplace. Many current commercial
owners of ILCs, for instance, are far larger than their ILCs and much
larger than most banking organizations. This size and the nature of their
commercial operations would undoubtedly pose difficulties for banking
supervisors that have been trained mostly to look at financial operations.
The FDIC has taken a number of steps in its ILC examination and
application processes to assess the potential risks that an owner could
pose to an insured ILC and to monitor these parent company risks.
Such steps thus inject some elements of consolidated supervision into
ILC oversight, but they may not completely substitute for consolidated
supervision or carry the same enforcement authority. To address these
possible shortcomings, the legislation currently being considered in
Congress to prevent new commercial ownership of ILCs would also
place ILC operations under a consolidated supervisory framework.
Conflicts of interest
A second public policy issue associated with ILCs owned by com-
mercial and financial firms is that these ILCs might be encouraged to
sacrifice their own interests, while favoring those of the parent, other
affiliates, or the parent’s customers. As a result, ILCs could face conflicts
of interest that might be resolved to their own detriment.
There are several basic examples of conflicts that might arise between
an ILC and its parent, especially if the ILC is owned by a commercial or
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financial institutions and that appear relevant for ILCs are: 1) lending to
an affiliate or customer of an affiliate at a favorable rate or on concession-
ary terms (including without due regard for creditworthiness) in order to
directly help the affiliate or boost its business; 2) refusing to lend to com-
petitors of the parent organization or its affiliates, which could harm a
bank’s business opportunities and reduce financial competition and eco-
nomic growth; and 3) using bank resources to bail out the parent
company or any affiliates if they encounter problems.
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While these conflicts are all conceivable, a number of factors could
limit their occurrence and their overall effects. With regard to the first
type of conflict, transactions favoring or benefiting affiliates, Sections
23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act limit an ILC’s ability to use
deposits to fund such transactions.
27 Although there can be difficulties in
ensuring full compliance with these laws, the previous review of individ-
ual ILCs pointed out several examples where the restrictions either
helped limit affiliate transactions or forced the parent company to
provide the funding for such transactions, thus reducing the risk to the
ILC. To further ensure compliance with these provisions, supervisors can
use a range of enforcement actions to discourage any significant viola-
tions by ILC managers. In addition to regulatory restrictions on affiliate
transactions, discipline from funding markets and a company’s concern
for its reputation will also play a role in limiting this type of conflict.
The second conflict—refusing to lend to competitors of the parent
organization—also may not be a major concern in the case of ILCs
owned by large commercial or financial companies. For the most part,
an accessible and competitive financial marketplace now significantly
limits any organization’s ability to exploit this conflict and keep its com-
petitors from finding financing elsewhere. Also, as shown in the
previous section, a number of existing ILCs, particularly those owned by
financial firms, appear to be lending to a wide range of customers and
have sought out the best lending opportunities rather than pursuing
those most closely tied to the parent’s business lines. In some cases, ILCs
under commercial ownership have targeted their lending toward the
customers, dealers, and distributors of the parent company, with little, if
any, lending going to competitors. This targeted lending, though, is
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still have many other sources of financing, and the ILC lending may be
little more than a replacement for loans previously made by captive
finance companies and other subsidiaries of the parent organization.
The final conflicts concern—that ILCs would use their resources to
bail out a parent—may also be controllable in most circumstances. ILC
regulators can again limit transactions that would aid a parent or affili-
ate, and they may take other actions, such as restricting the dividends
paid out by an ILC, to keep resources at the ILC level. Overall, these
three conflicts facing ILCs owned by commercial and financial firms are
not likely to be much different from and, in some cases, may be less
than those from the mixing of banking, securities, and insurance that
has occurred under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.
Competitive effects
A third public policy issue—that competition would be harmed by
the emergence of large, commercially owned ILCs—has yet to find
much support in the recent expansion of ILCs. The description of
financial and commercial ILCs in the preceding section indicates that
many of these ILCs largely do what the parent company or its sub-
sidiaries had once done through other means. In a number of instances,
ILC entry by commercial or financial firms has even helped provide a
new or a better way for reaching certain customers, thus increasing the
competitive interplay in financial markets.
Retail banking, which may be the area of greatest concern from a
competitive standpoint, has largely been unaffected by commercial ILC
ownership. Few of the new ILCs appear to be competing directly for
retail banking business by offering services similar to those of banks in
the local market. Nor have they seemed willing to incur the cost of
establishing an extensive office network and staff or to offer much in the
way of transaction or payment services. At some point, a commercial
firm with a convenient network of offices might choose to develop a
retail ILC operation, much in the manner that many speculated Wal-
Mart might want to do. While a major retailer might be able to make
some inroads into banking markets and shift the competitive balance,
this new entry would be more likely to increase than to decrease finan-
cial competition. Also, any ILC pursuing this strategy would have to62 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
prove itself against a variety of competing institutions, which has been
an elusive task for a number of companies that have previously tried to
jump into a broad range of financial services.
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Safety net concerns
A final public policy question is whether ILC ownership by com-
mercial or financial firms raises safety net concerns and might lead to a
further extension of the federal safety net in banking. This safety net
consists of deposit insurance, the Federal Reserve System’s discount
window, and a number of other tools banking regulators have to protect
financial markets and participants. While the primary purpose of this
safety net is to prevent financial panics and protect small depositors, it
also raises a number of public policy issues and questions about how far
it should be extended.
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Federal deposit insurance, for instance, was introduced in the 1930s
in an effort to restore confidence in banks, prevent future banking runs
and panics, and protect depositors with modest accounts against loss.
However, because insured depositors no longer have a need to be con-
cerned about bankers taking on more risk, deposit insurance has also led
to moral hazard problems and removed a key source of market discipline
for banks. Other elements of the safety net have had similar effects by
reducing the market pressure on bankers to maintain higher levels of liq-
uidity, capital, and asset quality. To address such issues, supervisory
authorities must monitor a bank’s risk exposure and its liquidity, impose
minimum capital standards, and set higher deposit insurance premiums
for banks with greater perceived risks. These steps, though, are not likely
to be perfect substitutes for the “lost” market incentives and may have
additional regulatory costs. As a result, some have argued that parts of
the safety net should be rolled back or the range of institutions covered
by it should be limited.          
Two safety net issues could potentially arise with ILCs owned by
commercial and financial firms. First, some opponents of ILC expan-
sion have expressed a concern that serious problems at an ILC and its
parent could force supervisors to take steps to support the parent
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activities. They view this as even more likely when an ILC’s operations
are closely intertwined with those of the parent, as is the case for many
commercial and financial ILCs.
FDIC and state ILC regulators have generally taken the position
that their bank-centric supervisory approach and their ILC regulatory
powers would still allow them to separate and isolate ILCs from their
parents, thereby preventing the safety net from being extended beyond
the ILC.
30 Some support for this comes from the actions a number of
commercial companies have taken to restructure their ILC operations
and, in several cases, sell their ILC interests to other companies. ILC
regulators also argue that they can rely on readily available market infor-
mation and their own insights to judge the condition of large parent
companies and any resulting implications for supervisory action at the
ILC level. While much of this may be true under normal market condi-
tions, these approaches have yet to be tested with larger ILCs and under
more disruptive circumstances. 
A second and more critical safety net issue is associated with com-
mercial and financial firms using insured deposits and their ILCs to fund
activities that were previously financed through the capital markets. Secu-
rities brokerage customers that once had their idle balances placed in
money market mutual funds are now putting such funds into insured
ILC deposits. Similarly, commercial companies running ILCs, such as
auto manufacturers and other large firms, are now using insured ILC
deposits to fund loans they once made through captive nonbank sub-
sidiaries and financed through the commercial paper market, loans from
commercial banks, and longer-term debt and equity markets. As a result,
substantial volumes of lending that were previously governed by market
discipline are beginning to have safety net implications and are falling
under supervisory oversight. The current interest by many commercial
and financial firms in opening ILCs suggests that much more of this
lending could eventually take place under safety net protections.
The first safety net issue—extending the safety net to protect parent
companies—is largely a judgmental issue and should further be weighed
against the strength and assistance that large financial and commercial
firms have already provided to their ILCs. The second concern—the use
of insured ILCs to fund activities that were formerly conducted in private64 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
capital markets—raises a more substantive concern about how the safety
net should be used and whether it provides subsidies and improper
incentives to insured institutions that should be carefully limited.
V. SUMMARY
The ILC industry has experienced rapid growth over the last
decade, bringing with it a new financial framework—institutions that
can conduct a nearly full range of banking services while operating
under the ownership of companies engaged in commercial activities.
This framework has reopened the long-standing debate over the mixing
of banking and commerce in the United States—a debate that should
intensify as the time—January 31, 2008—approaches for the FDIC to
remove its moratorium on ILC applications by commercial firms.
Our review of the operations of ILCs owned by large financial and
commercial firms shows that, in a relatively short period of time, they
have been able to achieve a record of sound performance, innovative
approaches, and strong parent company support. These benefits,
though, must be balanced against many of the concerns commonly
associated with the banking/commerce debate, most notably safety and
soundness questions, conflicts of interest, and competitive effects. These
issues are not much different from those posed by the mixing of
banking, securities, and insurance under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
of 1999. Many of these concerns are also similar to what banking
authorities currently face in their oversight of traditional depository
institutions. The recent experience with commercial and financial ILCs
indicates the current supervisory framework is capable of addressing
most of the public policy questions, but other issues may require further
debate. Among such issues are the role for consolidated supervision and
how ILC safety and soundness might be affected if industry expansion
were to bring in parent companies less capable of supporting their ILCs.  
A remaining and important issue raised by the broader ownership of
ILCs is how far public authorities should go in extending the federal
safety net. Most activities now conducted by ILCs under the ownership
of commercial and financial firms were once done outside of the
banking system and funded without the benefit of federal deposit insur-
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number of companies with access to government guarantees and puts
further pressure on ILC supervisors to control the inherent risks. A con-
tinuation of recent ILC growth trends would further increase this safety
net exposure. Much of this expansion, moreover, may be occurring
without public debate and consensus on whether the underlying guar-
antees can be appropriately priced and allocated on an evenhanded basis
or, alternatively, should be carefully restricted to a narrow audience.
There are no quick and easy answers to these supervisory and safety net
questions, but they play an important role in the ILC debate, as well as in
determining how the entire financial system should be structured and
supervised. The ILCs owned by commercial and financial companies have
helped to add innovation and competition to the marketplace, but many
questions still remain about how the ILC industry should be structured. 66 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
APPENDIX
INDUSTRIAL LOAN COMPANIES UNDER FINANCIAL
OR COMMERCIAL OWNERSHIP
(All financial data as of December 31, 2006, and in millions of $)
Year FDIC  Industrial loan Total  Total  Home Parent company
insurance company assets deposits state
was granted
1988 Merrill Lynch Bank USA 67,235 54,805 UT Merrill Lynch
2003 UBS Bank USA 22,009 19,270 UT UBS AG
1989 American Express  21,097 4,446 UT American Express
Centurion Bank
1990 Morgan Stanley Bank 21,020 16,555 UT Morgan Stanley
2004 GMAC Bank 19,937 9,910 UT Cerberus/GMAC
2004 Goldman Sachs Bank USA 12,649 11,020 UT Goldman Sachs
1996 USAA Savings Bank 5,826 314 NV USAA 
2003 Capmark Bank 3,774 2,880 UT Capmark Financial 
Group / GMAC
2005 Lehman Brothers  3,225 2,634 UT LehmanBrothers 
Commercial Bank Holdings Inc.
1999 BMW Bank of North America 2,220 1,591 UT BMW Group
1993 GE Capital Financial Inc. 1,992 218 UT GE 
(General Electric)
1991 Advanta Bank Corporation 1,958 1,374 UT Advanta
1984 Fireside Bank 1,382 1,163 CA Unitrin, Inc.
1997 Merrick Bank 1,032 813 UT CardWorks, LP
2002 Volkswagen Bank USA 665 488 UT Volkswagen
1998 Pitney Bowes Bank Inc. 644 517 UT Pitney Bowes
1998 Transportation Alliance Bank 483 407 UT Flying J, Inc.
2003 Exante Bank 391 296 UT UnitedHealth 
Group
2004 Toyota Financial Savings Bank 176 28 NV Toyota
1985 5 Star Bank 166 131 CO Armed Forces 
Benefit Association
2002 EnerBank 147 126 UT CMS Energy
1997 Eaglemark Savings Bank 25 2 NV Harley-Davidson
2000 First Electronic Bank 14 8 UT Fry’s Electronics
2004 Target Bank 14 8 UT Target CorporationECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2007 67
ENDNOTES
1The House of Representatives has passed a bill that would prevent future
acquisitions of ILCs by commercial firms, but the legislation has yet to receive
much consideration in the Senate, thus leaving this ownership issue still open.
With its plans delayed by the moratorium, Wal-Mart withdrew its ILC applica-
tion for deposit insurance in March 2007.
2Under the lending structure for Morris Plan banks, small uncollateralized
loans were extended to wage earners on the condition that these borrowers find
two people of similar economic standing to be cosigners. For more on Morris Plan
banks, see Phillips (2001).
3The seven states that still have active ILCs are California, Colorado, Hawaii,
Indiana, Minnesota, Nevada, and Utah.
4Prior to 1982, the FDIC had allowed some ILCs to become federally
insured, but FDIC insurance was typically limited to ILCs where state law
allowed them to receive “deposits” or to use “bank” in their name. For more on
FDIC insurance practices, see West (2004). 
512 USC 1841(c)(2)(H).
6A NOW (negotiable order of withdrawal) account is an interest-bearing
account with which customers may write drafts against the money they have on
deposit for the purpose of transferring funds to third parties. NOW accounts can
be used much like demand deposit checking accounts, but depository institutions
may legally (but virtually never do) require seven days written notice prior to any
withdrawals. Also, NOW accounts can be issued only to individuals, nonprofit
organizations, and certain governmental entities.
7For bank holding companies, the Federal Reserve is the consolidated supervisor,
while the Office of Thrift Supervision performs this role for thrift holding companies.
8The provisions of Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act (12 USC
371c and 371c-1) are extended to state-chartered, nonmember insured institu-
tions by 12 USC 1828(j)(1) (Section 18(j)(1) of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act). Under the implementing regulations, 12 CFR 223 (Federal Reserve Regula-
tion W), a bank’s transactions with unaffiliated parties can also be treated as trans-
actions with an affiliate if the proceeds “are used for the benefit of, or transferred
to, an affiliate.”
9Part of the data and the charts and tables in this paper are taken from Jones
(2006) and Bair (2007). 
10These ILC ownership categories reflect the classifications used by the FDIC
and reported in Sheila Bair’s Congressional testimony (Bair 2007). They are also
reflected in the numbers presented in Chart 1.
11Chart 1 tracks only those ILCs that were still in existence at yearend 2006.
For statistics and a chart on all ILCs over most of this period, see GAO (2005),
pp. 18-21.   
12Unless specifically noted, the information presented on individual ILCs in
this section comes from a wide variety of sources, including the Reports of Condi-
tion and Income that ILCs file with regulators, ILC and parent company websites
and press releases, deposit insurance applications and change in control notices filed
with the FDIC, the FDIC’s Community Reinvestment Act performance evaluations
of individual ILCs, and various newspaper and trade publication articles.
13Unless otherwise noted, all figures in this section are as of December 31, 2006.68 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
14Our division of ILCs into financial, commercial, and traditional does not
directly correspond to that used by the FDIC in Chart 1 and in Bair (2007) and
Jones (2006). We are discussing all ILCs that are owned by firms conducting
insurance activities under the category of financial companies. Some of these firms
may compete in very unique segments of the insurance market and also conduct
commercial activities, but we are choosing to put all of them in the same category. 
15The Utah Department of Financial Institutions has not yet approved the
charter. See Adler (2007).
16Volvo has also owned an ILC in Utah since 2000, but has been shrinking its
operations over the past few years and has reached an agreement to sell it.
17General Motors recently sold 51 percent ownership of General Motors
Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) and its subsidiaries to an investment consor-
tium led by Cerberus Capital Management, a private investment firm, thus giving
the consortium control of GMACB. Minority members of this consortium
include Citigroup, Inc.; The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.; and Aozora
Bank (a Japanese bank).
18For more information on this acquisition, see the press release of March 23,
2006, issued by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., and posted at www.kkr.com/news/
press_releases/2006/03-20-06.html.
19See page 45 and endnote 8 for a description of these provisions.
20Utah Association of Financial Services and California Association of Indus-
trial Banks (2006). 
21This description of the services offered by Transportation Alliance Bank
relies heavily on information reported in Utah Association of Financial Services
and California Association of Industrial Banks (2006). 
22For a look at this banking/commerce debate, see the following sources:
Blair (2004), Corrigan (1991), Haubrich (2003), Huertas (1988), Krainer
(2000), Mester (1992), Saunders (1994), Shull (1999), and Walter (2003).
23Articles that discuss the policy issues surrounding commercial ownership of
ILCs include:  Neely (2007), Schooner (2006), Wallison (2006), White (2006),
and Wilmarth (2007).
24For a more complete discussion on this consolidated supervisory issue and
the steps the FDIC has initiated to monitor parent company risk, see GAO
(2005), pp. 27-65; and Bovenzi (2007).
25The issue of a “supervisory blind spot” and the need for consolidated super-
vision was discussed by Alvarez (2006), Alvarez (2007), and Greenspan (2006).
26Wallison (2006) uses a similar set of conflicts in discussing the Wal-Mart
application and how the debate over financial conflicts of interest may have
changed with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 and its removal of the barriers
to affiliation between banks, securities firms, and insurance companies.
27See page 45 and endnote 8 of this article for more detail on Sections 23A
and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act.
28During the 1980s, for example, such companies as Sears, American Express,
and Ford Motor Co. tried to diversify by establishing large financial services net-
works. For Sears, this meant trying to combine its Allstate insurance operations
with its acquisitions of Coldwell Banker (a leader in real estate brokerage) and
Dean Witter (a securities brokerage firm) and its development of the Discover
credit card. American Express purchased several major securities and investmentECONOMIC REVIEW • FOURTH QUARTER 2007 69
companies, and Ford got into the savings and loan business by acquiring First
Nationwide and then beginning an aggressive nationwide expansion strategy. All
of these strategies eventually led to disappointing results and difficulties in merg-
ing customer bases and competing with more traditional institutions. As a result,
each of these companies sold or spun off their new financial activities during the
first half of the 1990s. 
29For a discussion of the federal safety net in banking and the issues it raises,
see Greenspan (2001).
30For a statement of this position, see the letter of August 29, 2005, by former
FDIC Chairman Donald Powell in GAO (2005), pp. 92-97.70 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
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